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What	do	we	know	about	rape	myths	and	juror	decision	making?	
	
Fiona	Leverick	
School	of	Law,	University	of	Glasgow	
	
Abstract	
	
This	paper	presents	overwhelming	evidence	that	prejudicial	and	false	beliefs	held	by	jurors	about	
rape	affect	 their	 evaluation	of	 the	evidence	and	 their	decision	making	 in	 rape	 cases.	 The	paper	
draws	 together	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 available	 evidence	 from	 both	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	
studies	 (most	 of	 which	 are	 not	 found	 in	 law	 journals,	 but	 rather	 in	 scientific	 outlets,	 most	
commonly	 those	 focusing	on	experimental	psychology).	The	quantitative	 research	demonstrates	
that	 mock	 jurors’	 scores	 on	 so-called	 “rape	 myth	 scales”	 are	 significant	 predictors	 of	 their	
judgments	 about	 responsibility,	 blame	 and	 (most	 importantly)	 verdict.	 The	 qualitative	 research	
indicates	 that	 jurors	 frequently	 express	 problematic	 views	 about	 how	 ‘real’	 rape	 victims	would	
behave	and	what	 ‘real’	 rape	 looks	 like	during	mock	 jury	deliberations	and	 that	even	 those	who	
score	relatively	low	on	abstract	rape	myth	scales	can	express	prejudicial	beliefs	when	deliberating	
in	a	particular	case.	The	studies	vary	in	terms	of	their	realism,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	some	
of	 the	 studies	 reported	 here	were	 highly	 realistic	 trial	 reconstructions,	 involving	 representative	
samples	 of	 jurors	 drawn	 from	 the	 community,	 live	 trial	 reconstructions,	 evidence	 in	 chief	 and	
cross-examination,	accurate	 legal	directions	and	deliberation	 in	groups.	The	review	concludes	by	
examining	the	evidence	on	whether	juror	education	–	whether	in	the	form	of	judicial	directions	or	
expert	evidence	–	might	be	effective	in	addressing	problematic	attitudes.	
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1.	Introduction	
	
The	decision	making	of	juries	in	rape	and	other	sexual	offence	cases1	is	an	issue	that	has	attracted	
a	 great	deal	 of	 attention.	 There	 is	 a	 concern,	 in	particular,	 that	prejudicial	 beliefs	 and	attitudes	
that	jurors	take	into	the	deliberation	room	(sometimes	referred	to	as	rape	myths)	impact	on	their	
evaluation	of	evidence	and	determination	of	verdict	(Conaghan	and	Russell,	2014).	This	concern	is	
sometimes	dismissed,	 pointing	 to	 a	 lack	of	 evidence	of	 any	problems	 (Reece,	 2013).	 This	 paper	
supplies	 the	missing	 evidence.	 It	 draws	 together	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 relevant	
studies	(most	of	which	are	not	reported	in	law	journals,	but	are	found	instead	in	scientific	outlets,	
most	commonly	those	focusing	on	experimental	psychology).		
	
The	 focus	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 not	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 jury	 eligible	 population	 holds	 prejudicial	
attitudes	 towards	 rape	 victims	 (although	 this	 might	 become	 apparent	 as	 a	 side	 issue	 of	 the	
discussion).	 Rather	 it	 is	 to	 examine	 the	way	 in	which	 such	 attitudes	might	 affect	 juror	 decision	
making.	 Two	 types	 of	 studies	 are	 relevant	 in	 this	 respect:	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative.	
Quantitative	studies	attempt	to	correlate	participants’	scores	on	a	scale	designed	to	measure	their	
attitudes	 towards	 rape	 victims	 in	 the	 abstract	 (so-called	 rape	 myth	 attitude	 scales)	 with	 a	
																																																													
1	The	remainder	of	 the	review	will	generally	 refer	 to	“rape	cases”	but	 the	 findings	are	applicable	 to	a	 far	
wider	set	of	cases	involving	sexual	offences.	
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dependent	 variable	 in	 a	 concrete	 case,	 such	 as	 verdict	 choice	 or	witness	 credibility.	Qualitative	
studies	 examine	 the	 way	 in	 which	 prejudicial	 attitudes	 towards	 rape	 victims	 arise	 in	 jury	
deliberations.	
	
This	paper	argues	 that	 there	 is	overwhelming	evidence	 that	 rape	myths	affect	 the	way	 in	which	
jurors	evaluate	evidence	in	rape	cases.	The	quantitative	research	demonstrates	that	jurors’	scores	
on	rape	myth	attitude	scales	designed	to	measure	prejudicial	attitudes	towards	rape	victims	are	
significantly	 related	 to	 judgments	 in	 individual	 cases,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 blame	
attributed	to	a	rape	victim	and	–	more	importantly	–	views	about	what	the	verdict	should	be.	The	
qualitative	 research	 shows	 that	 false	 and	 prejudicial	 beliefs	 about	 rape	 victims	 are	 commonly	
expressed	during	 jury	deliberations	and	 that	even	 jurors	who	do	not	 score	highly	on	scales	 that	
measure	attitudes	in	the	abstract	can	express	highly	problematic	views	when	discussing	a	concrete	
case.	
	
Before	proceeding,	it	needs	to	be	noted	that	the	focus	of	this	review	is	limited	to	rape	involving	a	
female	 complainant2/victim	 and	 a	 male	 defendant3/perpetrator.	 The	 literature	 on	 attitudes	
towards	male	rape	victims	 is	 far	 less	extensive.4	The	research	that	does	exist	points	 in	 the	same	
direction	as	the	studies	involving	a	female	complainant/victim,	but	there	is	no	doubt	that	this	is	an	
area	that	would	benefit	from	further	research.		
	
In	the	remainder	of	the	paper,	section	2	briefly	examines	the	scales	that	have	been	designed	to	
measure	attitudes	towards	rape	victims.	Section	3	discusses	the	research	methods	that	have	been	
used	in	the	studies	presented	here.	Section	4	presents	the	findings	of	the	quantitative	studies	and	
section	5	the	findings	of	the	qualitative	studies.	Section	6	reviews	the	limited	body	of	research	that	
has	examined	juror	education	(whether	 in	the	form	of	 judicial	direction	or	expert	evidence)	as	a	
means	of	addressing	false	beliefs.	
	
2.	Attitudes	towards	rape	victims	and	instruments	to	measure	them	
	
The	 focus	of	 this	 paper	 is	 on	 false	 and	prejudicial	 beliefs	 about	 rape	 and	 rape	 victims	 and	how	
these	 might	 impact	 upon	 the	 way	 in	 which	 jurors	 approach	 the	 evidence	 in	 rape	 cases.	 Such	
beliefs	can	broadly	be	divided	into	four	categories:5	
	
Beliefs	that	blame	the	victim/survivor	(such	as	the	belief	that	people	who	get	voluntarily	
intoxicated	 are	 at	 least	 partly	 responsible	 for	 their	 rape,	 that	 if	 the	 complainer	 did	 not	
scream,	fight	or	get	injured,	then	it	is	not	rape	or	that	it	is	not	rape	if	a	complainer	fails	to	
sufficiently	communicate	her	lack	of	consent	to	the	accused).	
Beliefs	 that	 cast	 doubt	 on	 allegations	 (such	 as	 the	 belief	 that	 false	 allegations	 due	 to	
revenge	or	regret	are	common	or	that	any	delay	in	reporting	rape	is	suspicious).	
																																																													
2	Some	of	 the	research	has	been	undertaken	 in	Scotland,	where	 the	equivalent	 term	 is	“complainer”	and	
this	will	be	used	when	discussing	the	Scottish	research.		
3	The	Scottish	equivalent	is	“the	accused”	and	this	will	be	used	when	discussing	the	Scottish	research.	
4	Only	four	studies	 in	peer	reviewed	journals	were	 identified	that	have	examined	the	link	between	scores	
on	 rape	myth	 attitude	 scales	 and	 judgments	 about	 responsibility	where	 the	 victim/complainant	 is	male:	
studies	3	and	4	in	Klement	et	al	(2019)	(studies	1	and	2	involved	female	victims	and	are	discussed	below);	
Sleath	Bull	(2010);	Davies	et	al	(2012).	
5	These	are	adapted	from	Bohner	et	al	(2009:	19)	and	Smith	and	Skinner	(2017:	443).	There	is	some	overlap	
between	the	categories.	
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Beliefs	 that	 excuse	 the	 accused	 (such	as	 the	belief	 that	male	 sexuality	 is	 uncontrollable	
once	‘ignited’,	or	that	women	often	send	mixed	signals	about	their	willingness	to	engage	in	
sexual	activity).	
Beliefs	about	what	‘real	rape’	looks	like	(such	as	the	belief	that	rape	only	occurs	between	
strangers	in	public	places,	that	it	is	always	accompanied	by	violence	or	that	male	rape	only	
occurs	between	gay	men).	
	
These	 types	of	belief	 are	 sometimes	described	as	 “rape	myths”,	which	Gerger	et	 al	 (2007:	423)	
define	as:			
	
descriptive	or	prescriptive	beliefs	about	rape	(i.e.,	about	its	causes,	context,	consequences,	
perpetrators,	victims,	and	their	interaction)	that	serve	to	deny,	downplay	or	justify	sexual	
violence	that	men	commit	against	women.	
	
Gerger	avoids	the	 language	of	 falsity,	which	tended	to	be	a	feature	of	earlier	definitions	of	rape	
myths	(see	e.g.	Burt,	1980:	217),	but	that	would	seem	unnecessary.	The	vast	majority	–	if	not	all	–	
beliefs	 that	 are	 described	 as	 rape	myths	 are	 false	 if	 they	 are	 expressed	 as	 general	 statements	
applicable	to	all	rape	cases,	even	if	they	might	be	true	in	a	smaller	sub-set	of	cases.	
	
Various	instruments	have	been	devised	to	measure	the	extent	to	which	rape	myths	are	believed.	
Some	of	 the	most	notable	early	 scales	 (used	 in	 some	of	 the	studies	discussed	 later)	were	 those	
developed	 by	 Burt	 (1980),	 Feild	 (1978)	 and	 Costin	 (1985).	 All	 of	 these	 are	 relatively	
unsophisticated	 and	 suffer	 from	 issues	 such	 as	 a	 lack	 of	 subtlety	 and	 overly	 complex	 wording	
(Payne	et	al,	1999:	33).	In	an	attempt	to	address	this,	alternative	scales	have	been	developed.	The	
two	that	are	most	commonly	utilised	by	 the	studies	 included	 in	 this	 review	are	 the	 Illinois	Rape	
Myth	Acceptance	Scale	(IRMAS)	(Payne	et	al,	1999)	and	the	Acceptance	of	Modern	Myths	About	
Sexual	Aggression	(AMMSA)	scale	(Gerger	et	al,	2007).	The	IRMAS	consists	of	45	statements	and	
participants	are	asked	to	indicate	the	extent	to	which	they	agree	with	each	of	them	on	a	seven-
point	scale	from	“not	at	all	agree”	to	“very	much	agree”.	Examples	of	statements	include	“many	
so-called	rape	victims	are	actually	women	who	had	sex	and	changed	their	minds	afterwards”,	“a	
rape	probably	didn’t	happen	if	the	woman	has	no	bruises	or	marks”	and	“men	don’t	usually	intend	
to	force	sex	on	a	woman,	but	sometimes	they	get	too	sexually	carried	away”.	The	AMMSA	consists	
of	30	statements,	on	which	respondents	express	their	 level	of	agreement	on	a	seven-point	scale	
from	“completely	agree”	to	“completely	disagree”.	Examples	include	“alcohol	 is	often	the	culprit	
when	 a	 man	 rapes	 a	 woman”,	 “women	 often	 accuse	 their	 husbands	 of	 marital	 rape	 just	 to	
retaliate	 for	 a	 failed	 relationship”	 and	 “it	 is	 a	 biological	 necessity	 for	 men	 to	 release	 sexual	
pressure	from	time	to	time”.	
	
Both	scales	have	been	criticised	for	their	use	of	complex	language	(McMahon	and	Farmer,	2011:	
71).	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 of	 the	 AMMSA,	which	 includes	 statements	 such	 as	 “a	 lot	 of	women	
strongly	complain	about	sexual	infringements	for	no	real	reason,	just	to	appear	emancipated”	and	
“when	defining	marital	rape,	there	is	no	clear-cut	distinction	between	normal	conjugal	intercourse	
and	 rape”.6	McMahon	 and	 Farmer	 attempt	 to	 address	 this	 issue	 in	 their	 Subtle	 Rape	 Myth	
																																																													
6	This	 may	 be	 due	 in	 part	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 scale	 was	 originally	 developed	 in	 German	 and	 has	 been	
translated	into	English.	The	German	version	of	the	question	on	marital	rape	uses	“ehelichen”	which	could	
simply	 be	 translated	 as	 “marital”	 –	 the	 choice	 of	 “conjugal”	 probably	 makes	 the	 question	 seem	 more	
complex	than	it	is.	However,	the	same	point	cannot	be	made	about	the	other	question,	where	the	original	
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Acceptance	 Scale	 (SRMAS),	 a	 scale	 based	 on	 the	 IRMAS,	 but	 which	 uses	 simplified	 language.	
Typical	statements	include	“a	lot	of	times,	girls	who	say	they	were	raped	often	led	the	guy	on	and	
then	had	regrets”	and	“if	a	girl	doesn’t	physically	fight	back,	you	can’t	really	say	it	was	rape”.	
	
All	 of	 these	 scales	might	 be	 criticised	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 subtlety.	Many	 of	 the	 statements	 have	 too	
obvious	a	socially	acceptable	answer	and	therefore	participants	might	not	give	honest	responses.	
This	is	a	point	that	can	be	made	even	of	those	scales	that	purport	to	address	this	issue,	such	as	the	
SRMAS.	 However,	 this	 is	 mitigated	 to	 an	 extent	 by	 the	 use	 of	 seven-point	 scales,	 rather	 than	
binary	responses,	as	scales	of	 this	nature	are	able	to	capture	relatively	 low	 levels	of	support	 for	
the	beliefs	in	question.	And,	as	the	studies	reported	here	show,	the	scales	do	succeed	in	picking	up	
differences	of	sufficient	magnitude	to	enable	meaningful	statistical	analysis	to	be	conducted.	
	
Various	 studies	 have	 explored	 (in	 the	 abstract)	 the	 prevalence	 of	 rape	 myths	 among	 the	
population	 –	 both	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 further	 afield.7	Studies	 have	 consistently	 found	 that	 men	 are	
more	 likely	 to	 endorse	 rape	myths	 than	 women	 (Hockett	 et	 al,	 2016)	 as	 are	 those	 with	 lower	
educational	 levels	 (Suarex	and	Gadella,	2010:	2019;	 Johnson	and	Beech,	2017:	28).	Studies	have	
also	found	that	there	is	a	significant	relationship	between	scores	on	rape	myth	scales	and	scores	
on	other	instruments.	Particularly	notable	here	is	the	relationship	between	rape	myth	scales	and	
scores	on	scales	measuring	the	extent	to	which	people	hold	what	have	been	termed	“just	world	
beliefs”	 (Lerner,	 1980),	 as	 this	might	 explain	why	 some	people	 –	women	 in	particular	 –	 believe	
rape	myths.	Just	world	beliefs	are	beliefs	that	“the	world	is	a	just	place	where	good	things	happen	
to	good	people	and	bad	things	happen	only	to	those	who	deserve	them”	(Lonsway	and	Fitzgerald,	
1994:	135).	 It	 is	the	 latter	of	these	two	concepts	(measured	by	a	section	of	the	just	world	belief	
scale	called	“JWB-other”)	that	is	especially	closely	related	to	holding	rape	myth	beliefs	(Hayes	et	al,	
2013;	Russell	and	Hand,	2017).	It	may	be	that	this	is	because	some	rape	myths	(such	as	the	belief	
that	intoxicated	victims	are	partly	to	blame	if	they	are	raped)	perform	the	function	of	reassuring	
people	that	it	is	not	going	to	happen	to	them,	as	they	would	not	engage	in	the	behaviour	that	is	
perceived	as	risky.	
	
3.	Study	research	methods	
	
Before	examining	the	relevant	studies,	 it	 is	necessary	to	say	a	 little	about	the	research	methods	
that	have	been	used.	Because	of	the	legal	restrictions	on	(and	practical	difficulties	of)	asking	jurors	
about	 real	 cases,8	all	 of	 the	 studies	 included	 in	 this	 review	 involved	 mock	 jurors.	 Mock	 juror	
studies	 simulate	 the	 experience	 of	 sitting	 on	 a	 jury	 by	 asking	 participants	 to	 read,	 listen	 to,	 or	
watch	trial	materials.	The	trial	materials	used	are	generally	fictional	and	significantly	abbreviated	
in	comparison	with	a	real	criminal	trial.	Studies	vary	greatly	in	terms	of	the	extent	of	their	realism	
and	 this	 in	 turn	affects	 generalisability	–	how	 far	 their	 findings	are	 likely	 to	apply	 to	 real	 juries,	
deliberating	 in	 actual	 criminal	 trials.	 In	 assessing	 realism,	 four	 issues	 in	 particular	 require	
consideration.	
																																																																																																																																																																																																										
German	of	“emancipated”	is	“emanzipiert”.	Thanks	are	due	to	James	Chalmers’	German	language	skills	for	
this	point.	
7	For	a	review	of	this	literature,	see	Dinos	et	al	(2015).	
8	Restrictions	under	section	20D	of	the	Juries	Act	1974	in	England	and	Wales	(and	section	8	of	the	Contempt	
of	 Court	 Act	 1981	 in	 Scotland)	 specifically	 preclude	 asking	 jurors	 about	 “statements	 made,	 opinions	
expressed,	arguments	advanced	or	votes	cast	by	members	of	a	 jury	 in	 the	course	of	 their	deliberations”.	
This	 would	 clearly	 prohibit	 asking	 them	 about	 their	 verdict	 choices,	 or	 about	 attitudes	 towards	 the	
complainant	or	defenfant	that	they	had	expressed	during	deliberations.	
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3.1	How	representative	was	the	sample	of	mock	jurors?		
	
Academic	 mock	 jury	 studies	 sometimes	 use	 a	 convenience	 sample	 of	 students.	 This	 inevitably	
means	 that	 the	 profile	 of	 their	 ‘mock	 jurors’	 is	 different	 to	 that	 of	 real	 jurors	 in	 terms	 of	
characteristics	like	age	and	education.	Researchers	have	debated	how	much	this	matters	in	terms	
of	the	wider	generalisability	of	the	findings	(cf.	Bornstein	et	al,	2017:	25;	Wiener	et	al,	2011:	472).	
In	the	present	context,	as	scores	on	scales	measuring	rape-myth	supporting	attitudes	tend	to	be	
lower	 among	 those	 with	 higher	 educational	 levels,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 student	 sample	 is	 likely	 –	 if	
anything	–	to	under-estimate	the	extent	to	which	rape	myths	might	affect	juror	decision	making.	
	
3.2	How	realistic	were	the	trial	stimulus	materials?		
	
To	 create	 as	 realistic	 an	 experience	 as	 possible,	 some	 mock	 jury	 studies	 show	 participants	 an	
audio-visual	enactment	of	a	 trial	 (either	a	video	or	a	 live	re-enactment).	However,	other	studies	
have	used	written	trial	transcripts,	study	packs,	or	short	vignettes	instead.	Even	where	jurors	are	
shown	a	video	or	live	re-enactment	of	a	trial,	it	is	important	to	assess	how	closely	this	reflects	the	
reality	of	a	criminal	trial	(for	example,	in	terms	of	the	accuracy	of	any	legal	instructions	provided).	
	
3.3	Did	mock	jurors	deliberate?		
	
Real	 juries	are	 required	 to	deliberate	as	a	group	before	 returning	a	 collective	verdict.	However,	
most	mock	 jury	 studies	do	not	 include	 this	element,	which	may	be	problematic	as	 research	has	
shown	that	jurors’	initial	views	may	shift	during	deliberation	(Sandys	and	Dillehay,	1995;	Ormston	
et	al,	2019).	In	the	present	context,	the	views	that	an	individual	juror	holds	about	rape	might	be	
affected	 by	 what	 other	 jurors	 say,	 and	 this	 is	 a	 shift	 that	 might	 happen	 in	 either	 direction.	
Discussion	may	well	ameliorate	problematic	attitudes	 if	 jurors	are	challenged	by	other	 jurors,	or	
harden	 them	 if	other	 jurors	 share	 the	same	views	 (or	persuade	 jurors	who	did	not	 initially	hold	
such	views	to	adopt	them).		
	
3.4	How	seriously	did	mock	jurors	engage	with	their	‘role’?		
	
Mock	jurors	are	obviously	aware	that	they	are	role-playing	and	that,	as	such,	their	decisions	will	
not	have	‘real’	consequences.	That	said,	there	is	compelling	evidence	that	mock	jurors	engage	very	
seriously	 with	 their	 role	 (Finch	 and	 Munro,	 2008;	 Ellison	 and	 Munro,	 2010b;	 Ellsworth,	 1989;	
Ormston	et	al,	2019).	To	increase	the	likelihood	of	mock	jurors	taking	their	task	seriously,	studies	
will	ideally	take	as	many	steps	as	possible	to	maximise	the	solemnity	of	proceedings,	such	as	using	
appropriate	venues	and	directing	mock	jurors	about	their	role	in	a	similar	way	to	real	jurors.	
	
4.	Quantitative	studies	
	
4.1	 The	 link	 between	 juror	 attitudes	 and	 judgments	 about	 blame	 in	 a	 particular	
scenario	
	
A	 substantial	 body	 of	 research	 has	 examined	 whether	 juror	 attitudes	 towards	 rape	 and	 rape	
victims	held	in	the	abstract	predict	the	extent	to	which	a	particular	victim	and/or	perpetrator	are	
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thought	to	be	‘responsible’	or	‘at	fault’	for	an	incident.9	These	studies	present	participants	with	a	
scenario	in	which	it	is	stated	or	made	clear	that	a	non-consensual	sexual	encounter	took	place	and	
ask	 them	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 perpetrator	 and/or	 victim	 were	 to	 blame	 for	 what	
happened.	This	measure	is	then	correlated	with	participants’	scores	on	one	of	the	scales	designed	
to	measure	rape	myth	supporting	attitudes	(which,	for	brevity,	will	subsequently	be	referred	to	as	
RMA	scales	and/or	RMA	scores).		
	
At	the	time	of	writing,	29	studies	in	peer	reviewed	journals	were	identified	(table	1).	All	the	studies	
were	conducted	in	the	US	unless	otherwise	specified.	In	tables	1	and	2,	“written	vignette”	is	used	
to	mean	a	short	(usually	single	paragraph	and	no	more	than	one	page)	summary	of	events.	“Trial	
summary”	 means	 a	 longer	 written	 stimulus	 (although	 still	 in	 summary	 form).	 “Trial	 transcript”	
means	a	written	document	that	sets	out	the	evidence	in	script	form.	
	
Table	1:	Studies	examining	RMA	scores	and	victim/perpetrator	blame	
	
Study	 Sample	 Process	 Rape	
myth	
scale	
Measure	of	blame	 Significant10	
relationship?	
1. Ayala	et	al	
(2015)	
221	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS		
	
Extent	to	which	
victim/perpetrator	
was	“to	blame”	(7-
point	scale).	
Yes	
2. Basow	and	
Minieri	
(2011)	
188	students	 Written	
vignette.		
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS		
	
Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(6-point	
scale).	
Yes	
3. Cohn	et	al	
(2009)	
study	1	
250	students	 Video	
recreation	of	
an	incident.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRAMS		
	
Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(scale	
unspecified).	
Yes	
4. Cohn	et	al	
(2009)	
study	2	
274	students	 Video	
recreation	of	
an	incident.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRAMS		
	
Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(scale	
unspecified).	
Yes	
5. Dawtry	et	
al	(2019)	
study	1	
255	
community	
participants	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRAMS		
	
Extent	to	which	victim	
was	“to	blame”	(7-
point	scale).	
Yes	
6. Dawtry	et	
al	(2019)	
study	2	
255	
community	
participants	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRAMS		
	
Extent	to	which	victim	
was	“to	blame”	(7-
point	scale).	
Yes	
																																																													
9	Studies	involving	victims	under	16	have	not	been	included	here	but	see	e.g.	Tabak	and	Klettke	(2014).	
10	Significance	 here	 refers	 to	 statistical	 significance:	 that	 is,	 that	 differences	 reported	 in	 the	 experiment	
produced	so-called	p-values	of	at	least	<=0.05,	indicating	that	the	probability	of	such	a	difference	occurring	
in	the	experiment	when	there	is	no	actual	difference	in	reality	is	less	than	5%.	
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7. Deitz	et	al	
(1984)	
study	2	
376	(186	
students,	190	
community	
participants)	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Rape	
Empathy	
Scale	
(RES)11	
Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(7-point	
scale).	
Yes	
8. Frese	et	al	
(2004)	
182	Spanish	
students	
3	written	
vignettes	
(stranger,	
acquaintance,	
marital).	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Victim	responsibility	
(7-point	scale).	
Yes12		
9. Hine	and	
Murphy	
(2019)	
808	English	
police	
officers		
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
AMMSA		 Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(scale	of	
0-100).	
Yes	
10. Klement	et	
al	(2019)	
study	1	
97	students		 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS		 Victim/perpetrator	
culpability	(range	of	
questions	combined	
into	single	score).	
Yes	
11. Klement	et	
al	(2019)	
study	2	
90	students		 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS		 Victim/perpetrator	
culpability	(range	of	
questions	combined	
into	single	score).	
Yes	
12. Krahé	et	al	
(2007)	
study	1	
286	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Perceived	
Causes	of	
Rape	Scale	
(PCRS)13	
Composite	blame	
measures	for	
victim/perpetrator.	
Yes	
13. Krahé	et	al	
(2007)	
study	2	
158	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
PCRS	 Composite	blame	
measures	for	
victim/perpetrator.	
Yes	
14. Kopper	
(1996)	
534	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s		 Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(%	from	
1-100).	
Yes	
15. Mason	et	al	
(2004)	
157	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s		 Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(scale	of	
1-100).	
Yes14	
16. Masser	et	
al	(2010)	
120	
Australian	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Costin’s	R	 Composite	measure	
of	victim	blame.	
Yes	
																																																													
11	A	scale	developed	by	the	researchers.	
12	For	stranger	and	acquaintance	rape	only.	
13	An	RMA	scale	that	only	covers	myths	about	the	cases	of	rape:	Cowan	and	Quinton	(1997).	
14	For	victim	responsibility	only.	
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17. Milesi	et	al	
(2019)	
612	students	
(188	German	
157	Italian	
208	Spanish)	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
AMMSA	 Extent	to	which	victim	
“to	blame”	or	
“responsible”	(7-point	
scale)	
Yes	
18. Newcombe	
et	al	(2008)	
102	students	 4	written	
vignettes	
(stranger,	
acquaintance,		
date,	marital).	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS		 Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(11-
point	scale).	
Yes15		
19. Persson	et	
al	(2018)	
81	nursing	
staff	&	
students	
(England	&	
Sweden)	
2	written	
vignettes	
(stranger,	
acquaintance).	
No	
deliberation.	
AMMSA		 Extent	to	which	
victim/perpetrator	“to	
blame”	(7-point	
scale).	
Yes16		
20. Rollero	and	
Tartaglia	
(2019)	
264	Italian	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS	 Victim/perpetrator	
responsibility	(5-point	
scale).	
Yes	
21. Romero-
Sanchez	et	
al	(2012)	
study	1	
92	Spanish	
students	
2	written	
vignettes	
(alcohol,	
physical	force).	
No	
deliberation.	
AMMSA	 Extent	to	which	victim	
should	“blame	
herself”	(7-point	
scale).	
Yes	
22. Romero-
Sanchez	et	
al	(2012)	
study	2	
164	Spanish	
students	
2	written	
vignettes	
(alcohol,	
physical	force).	
No	
deliberation.	
AMMSA	 Extent	to	which	victim	
should	“blame	
herself”	(7-point	
scale).	
Yes	
23. Schuller	
and	
Hastings	
(2002)	
169	students	 45-minute	
audio	sexual	
assault	trial,	
with	judicial	
directions.	
No	
deliberation.	
Ward’s17	 Extent	to	which	victim	
and	perpetrator	
“blameworthy”	(7-
point	scale).	
Victim	and	
perpetrator	credibility	
(7-point	scale).	
Yes.	
24. Starfelt	et	
al	(2015)	
219	
Australian	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
IRMAS	 Composite	measure	
of	victim/perpetrator	
blame.	
Yes	
																																																													
15	Victim	responsibility	only	in	date	rape	scenario.	
16	For	acquaintance	rape	only.	
17	Ward’s	(1988)	Attitudes	Towards	Rape	Victims	scale.	
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25. Stewart	
and	
Jacquin	
(2010)	
2329	
students	
Abbreviated	
trial	transcript	
(6-page).	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Blameworthiness	of	
victim/perpetrator	(6-
point	scale).	
Yes	
26. Stormo	et	
al	(1997)	
742	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Blameworthiness	of	
victim/perpetrator	(5-
point	scale).	
Yes	
27. Wiener	et	
al	(1989)	
58	
community	
participants	
Trial	transcript	
(length	not	
specified).	
No	
deliberation.	
RES		 Responsibility	of	
perpetrator	(11-point	
scale).	
No	
28. Workman	
and	Orr	
(1996)	
632	students	 Photograph	of	
victim	and	
written	
vignette.	
No	
deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Responsibility	of	
victim/perpetrator	(8-
point	scale).	
Yes	
29. Zidenberg	
et	al	(2019)	
86	students,	
82	
community	
participants	
(Canadian).	
Written	police	
report	(1	
page).	
No	
deliberation.	
SRMAS	 Extent	to	which	victim	
“at	fault”,	“to	blame”,	
“responsible”	(7-point	
scale).	
Yes	
	
These	 studies	 are	 near	 unanimous	 in	 finding	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 scores	 on	 RMA	
scales	and	 judgments	about	victim/perpetrator	blame	 in	a	specific	 scenario.	The	only	study	 that	
did	 not	 find	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 these	 two	 constructs	 was	 that	 of	Weiner	 et	 al,	
where	there	were	only	58	participants.18		
	
That	 RMA	 scores	 correlate	 with	 judgments	 about	 blame	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising.	 Rape	 myth	
scales	measure	attitudes	 relating	 to	 rape	 in	 the	abstract	and	the	studies	 in	 table	1	demonstrate	
that	 these	 attitudes	 correlate	with	 attitudes	 towards	 rape	 victims	 and	 perpetrators	 in	 concrete	
cases.	 Lonsway	 and	 Fitzgerald	 (1994:	 148)	 describe	 this	 as	 “simple	 common	 sense,	 as	well	 as	 a	
certain	circularity”.	It	does	also	have	to	be	noted	that	the	realism	of	these	studies	is	not	generally	
high.	None	of	them	used	trial	videos	or	live	trial	re-enactments	and	none	included	an	element	of	
group	deliberation.	That	 said,	 the	 finding	 that	abstract	attitudes	do	 translate	 into	differences	 in	
views	about	a	particular	case	 is	an	 important	one.	 In	other	words,	two	people	can	be	presented	
with	the	exact	same	information	and	–	depending	on	their	score	on	an	abstract	rape	myth	scale	–	
will	have	different	views	on	the	extent	to	which	a	victim	or	perpetrator	of	rape	was	to	blame	for	
what	 happened.	 Of	 more	 importance,	 however,	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 those	 views	 might	
translate	into	verdict	preferences	and	it	is	to	that	the	review	now	turns.	
	
4.2	The	link	between	juror	attitudes	and	judgments	about	guilt	
		
																																																													
18	This	 study	 is	 discussed	 further	below	as	 it	 also	did	not	demonstrate	 a	 significant	 relationship	between	
RMA	scores	and	judgments	about	guilt.	
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A	 second	 body	 of	 research	 exists	 that	 has	 examined	 the	 relationship	 between	 RMA	 scores	 and	
decisions	 about	 guilt	 in	 a	 specific	 rape	 case	 or	 scenario.19	A	 meta-analysis	 undertaken	 in	 2015	
identified	nine	such	studies,	eight	of	which	reported	a	significant	relationship	between	these	two	
concepts	(Dinos,	2015).	There	were,	however,	a	substantial	number	of	relevant	studies	that	were	
not	 included	 in	 that	 analysis	 –	 either	 because	 they	 were	 not	 identified	 by	 the	 researchers	 or	
because	 they	 have	 been	 published	 subsequently.	 This	 analysis	 identified	 28	 relevant	 peer-
reviewed	studies20	(table	2).		
	
Table	2:	Studies	examining	RMA	scores	and	verdict	
	
Study	 Sample	 Process	 Scale	 Verdict	measure	 Significant	
relationship?	
1. Deitz	et	al	
(1984)	
study	221	
376	(186	
students,	
190	
community	
participants)	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
RES	 Certainty	of	guilt	(11-
point	scale	from	“not	
at	all	sure”	to	“very	
sure”).	
Yes	
2. Eyssel	and	
Bohner	
(2011)	
study	1	
170	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA		 Verdict	(G/NG)	 Yes	
3. Eyssel	and	
Bohner	
(2011)	
study	2	
160	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA		 Verdict	(G/NG)	 Yes	
4. Gray	(2006)	 180	British	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Verdict	(G/NG)	 Yes	
5. Hammond	
et	al	(2011)	
172	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Confidence	in	guilt	
(on	5-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all”	to	
“completely”).	
Yes	
6. Hine	and	
Murphy	
(2019)	
88	English	
police	
officers	
16	written	
vignettes	
(varied	
according	to	
stranger,	
partner,	timing	
of	resistance).	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA		 Was	this	an	
“authentic	rape”?	(on	
100-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all”	to	
“absolutely”).	
Yes	
	
																																																													
19 	There	 is	 some	 overlap	 between	 this	 and	 the	 body	 of	 research	 that	 has	 linked	 RMA	 scores	 with	
responsibility,	as	some	of	the	studies	investigated	both	issues.	
20	All	bar	one	were	published	in	peer-reviewed	journals.	The	exception	is	experiment	2	in	Willmott’s	thesis	
(item	 27	 in	 the	 table)	which,	 at	 the	 time	 of	writing,	 had	 not	 been	 reported	 in	 a	 peer	 reviewed	 journal.	
However,	his	 first	experiment,	which	has	been	reported	 in	a	peer-reviewed	journal,	uses	similar	methods	
and	analytical	techniques.			
21	Study	1	is	not	relevant	for	our	purposes.	
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7. Klement	et	
al	(2019)	
study	1	
97	students		 Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
IRMAS		 “How	guilty	do	you	
think	D	is?”	(11-point	
scale	from	“not	at	all”	
to	“very	much”).	
Yes	
8. Klement	et	
al	(2019)	
study	2	
90	students		 Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
IRMAS		 “How	guilty	do	you	
think	D	is?”	(11-point	
scale	from	“not	at	all”	
to	“very	much”)	
Yes	
9. Lee	et	al	
(2012)	
236	Korean	
police	
officers	
3	written	
vignettes	
(dating,	
acquaintance,	
marriage).	
No	deliberation.	
Bespoke	
scale	
based	
on	
IRMAS	
“How	certain	are	you	
that	this	incident	
would	be	considered	
rape?”	(5-point	scale).	
Yes22		
10. Mason	et	al	
(2004)	
157	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s		 “Should	D	be	held	
legally	responsible?”	
(5-point	scale	from	
“strongly	agree”	to	
“strongly	disagree”).	
Yes23	
11. McKimmie	
et	al	(2014)	
420	
community	
jurors	
2	written	trial	
summaries	(500	
words)	
(stranger,	
acquaintance).	
No	deliberation.	
Costin’s	
R		
Verdict	(G/NG)	and	
likelihood	of	guilt	(on	
7-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all”	to	“very	
much”).	
Yes	
12. Osborn	et	al	
(2018)	
experiment	
1	
218	students	 Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
IRMAS		 Verdict	(N/NG)	and	
sentence	length.	
Yes	
13. Osborn	et	al	
(2018)	
experiment	
2	
1084	
community	
jurors	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
IRMAS		 Verdict	(N/NG)	and	
sentence	length.	
Yes	
14. Romero-
Sanchez	et	
al	(2012)	
study	2	
164	Spanish	
students	
Two	written	
vignettes	
(alcohol,	
physical	force).	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA		 “Do	you	think	this	is	a	
sexual	assault?”	(7-
point	scale,	“strongly	
agree”	to	“strongly	
disagree”).	
Yes	
15. Schuller	and	
Hastings	
(2002)	
169	students	 Audio-recorded	
45-minute	
sexual	assault	
trial,	including	
judicial	
directions.	
No	deliberation.	
Ward’s		 Verdict	(G/NG)	and	
likelihood	of	guilt	(on	
7-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all	likely”	to	
“completely	likely”).	
Yes	
																																																													
22	But	only	for	the	“rape	survivor	myths”	part	of	the	scale.	
23	Relationship	only	with	one	part	of	Burt’s	scale	–	the	adversarial	sex	beliefs	component.	
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16. Schuller	and	
Wall	(1998)	
152	
community	
jurors	
4-page	trial	
summary,	plus	
judicial	
directions.	
No	deliberation.	
Ward’s	 Verdict	(G/NG)	and	
likelihood	of	guilt	(on	
7-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all	likely”	to	
“completely	likely”).	
Yes	
17. Stewart	and	
Jacquin	
(2010)	
2329	
students	
6-page	case	
summary	
(condensed	
version	of	trial	
transcript).	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Verdict	(G/NG)	and	
likelihood	of	guilt	(on	
4-point	scale	from	
“definitely	guilty”	to	
“definitely	not	
guilty”).	
Yes	
18. Stichman	et	
al	(2019)	
294	students	 1-hour	mock	
trial	–	some	saw	
live	re-
enactment,	
some	saw	video.	
No	deliberation.	
PCRS	 Verdict	(G/NG)	 No	
19. Süssenbach,	
Albrecht	
and	Bohner	
(2016)	
240	German	
students	
2	written	
vignettes	
(stranger,	met	
at	party)	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA	 “Is	D	guilty	of	a	
crime?”	(7-point	scale	
from	“not	at	all”	to	
“very	much”).	
Yes	
20. Süssenbach,	
Eyssel,	Rees	
and	Bohner	
(2017)	
study	1	
90	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA	 Likelihood	of	guilt	on	
7-point	scale	(“not	at	
all	probable”	to	“very	
probable”).	
Yes	
21. Süssenbach,	
Eyssel,	Rees	
and	Bohner	
(2017)	
study	2	
41	German	
students	
Written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
AMMSA	 Likelihood	of	guilt	on	
7-point	scale	(“not	at	
all	probable”	to	“very	
probable”).	
Yes	
22. Weir	and	
Wrightsman	
(1990)	
338	students	 12-page	trial	
transcript	
(complainant	
testimony	only,	
no	directions).	
No	deliberation.	
RES	 Verdict	(G/NG)	and	
likelihood	of	guilt	(on	
8-point	scale	from	
“not	at	all	confident”	
to	“extremely	
confident”).	
Yes	
23. Wenger	and	
Bornstein	
(2006)	
152	students	 3-page	trial	
summary.	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s	 Verdict	(G/NG)	 No	
13	
	
24. Westera	et	
al	(2015)	
96	Australian	
community	
participants.	
Audio	recording	
of	
complainant’s	
testimony	plus	
written	
summary	of	
prosecution	and	
defence	case.	
No	deliberation.	
Costin’s	
R	
Likelihood	of	guilt	(7-
point	scale).		
	
Yes	
25. Wiener	et	al	
(1989)	
58	
community	
participants	
Abbreviated	
trial	transcript	
(length	not	
specified).	
No	deliberation.	
RES		 Verdict	(G/NG)	 No	
26. Willmott	
(2018)	
experiment	
124	
324	English	
students	
25-minute	trial	
video,	including	
legal	directions.		
Deliberation	for	
up	to	90	
minutes	in	
groups	of	12.	
AMMSA		 Verdict	(G/NG)	pre-	
and	post-deliberation.	
Yes	
27. Willmott	
(2018)	
experiment	
2	
100	English	
community	
jurors	
Live	trial	re-
enactment,	
including	
judicial	
directions	(3.5	
hours).	
Deliberation	for	
up	to	2	hours	in	
groups	of	10-12.	
AMMSA	 Verdict	(G/NG)	pre-	
and	post-deliberation.	
Yes	
28. Workman	
and	Orr	
(1996)	
632	students	 Photograph	of	
complainant	
and	written	
vignette.	
No	deliberation.	
Burt’s		 Likelihood	that	
complainant	was	
raped	(8-point	scale).	
Yes	
	
All	but	three	of	the	28	studies	identified	found	a	significant	relationship	between	RMA	scores	and	
decisions	about	guilt.	 In	other	words,	people	presented	with	exactly	 the	same	 information	were	
significantly	more	or	less	likely	to	find	a	defendant	guilty	of	rape	depending	on	their	score	on	an	
RMA	scale.	
	
There	was	more	variation	in	the	research	methods	used	in	the	studies	in	table	2	than	in	table	1.	
Some	were	relatively	realistic	representations	of	the	trial	process,	but	others	had	methodological	
issues	that	limit	the	reliance	that	can	be	placed	on	their	findings.	This	was	true	of	all	three	of	the	
studies	 where	 no	 significant	 relationship	 was	 found	 (Weiner	 et	 al,	 Wenger	 and	 Bornstein	 and	
Stichman	et	al).	Weiner	et	al’s	study	is	30	years	old.	It	involved	only	58	participants,	the	smallest	
sample	of	 all	 of	 the	 studies	 identified,	 and	used	a	 relatively	outdated	RMA	 scale	 (the	RES).	 The	
																																																													
24	This	study	is	also	reported	in	Willmott	et	al	(2018).	
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Wenger	and	Bornstein	study	also	 involved	a	small	sample	(152	participants)	and	it	used	a	three-
page	written	summary	of	a	sexual	assault	trial	and,	like	Weiner	et	al,	used	an	outdated	RMA	scale	
(Burt’s).25	
	
Stichman	et	al’s	study	was	more	realistic.	It	used	a	shortened	version	of	a	trial	that	was	based	on	a	
real	case,	in	which	criminal	justice	professionals	played	the	legal	roles,	with	a	police	officer	as	the	
defendant	and	a	rape	crisis	counsellor	as	the	complainant.	The	mock	trial	was	performed	live	to	69	
of	the	294	participants	and	was	played	as	a	video	to	the	remainder.26	It	involved	testimony	from	
the	complainant	and	defendant	and	written	sworn	statements	from	other	witnesses.	Participants	
were	 given	written	 definitions	 of	 legal	 terms,	 including	 beyond	 reasonable	 doubt,	 before	 being	
asked	 to	 indicate	 whether	 the	 defendant	 was	 guilty.	 However,	 aside	 from	 its	 use	 of	 a	 wholly	
student	sample	(criminal	justice	and	sociology	students),	the	main	difficulty	with	the	study	lies	in	
its	use	of	the	Perceived	Causes	of	Rape	Scale	(PCRS).	The	PCRS	covers	five	possible	causes	of	rape:	
victim	precipitation	(e.g.	women	who	tease	men);	male	dominance	(e.g.	a	need	to	put	women	in	
their	 place);	 male	 sexuality	 (e.g.	 men	 who	 can’t	 control	 their	 sex	 drives);	 societal	 causes	 (e.g.	
violence	 towards	 women	 in	 the	 movies)	 and	 male	 pathology	 (for	 example	 men’s	 feelings	 of	
inferiority,	 inadequacy,	 and	 low	 self-esteem).	 It	 is	 one	 of	 the	 less	 subtle	 RMA	 scales	 and	 is	
relatively	narrow	in	the	range	of	rape	myths	it	includes.	Average	scores	on	the	scale	were	low,	as	
was	the	standard	deviation	(indicating	little	variation	in	participant	scores).	It	is	worth	noting	that	
the	researchers	also	recorded	the	students’	explanations	for	their	verdicts	and	these	did	indicate	
some	belief	 in	rape	myths	(for	example	comments	that	 it	was	the	complainant’s	fault	 if	she	was	
raped	as	she	willingly	let	the	defendant	into	her	apartment).	
	
It	 is	 not	 just	 the	 studies	 that	 failed	 to	 show	 a	 significant	 relationship	 that	 have	methodological	
issues.	For	example,	a	lot	of	the	other	studies	where	a	relationship	was	found	used	short	written	
vignettes	(with	no	legal	directions)	or	(what	are	now	regarded	as)	outdated	RMA	scales.	Some	of	
the	studies	used	measures	of	guilt	far	removed	from	the	binary	decision	that	jurors	make	in	reality	
–	particularly	notable	are	Klement	et	al	(who	asked	participants	to	rate	“how	guilty	do	you	think	
the	defendant	is?”	on	an	11-point	scale)	and	Süssenbach	et	al	(who	asked	“is	the	defendant	guilty	
of	a	crime?”	on	a	7-point	scale	from	“not	at	all”	to	“very	much”).	
	
However,	not	all	of	the	studies	suffered	from	methodological	weaknesses.	The	best	of	the	studies	
in	terms	of	realism	were	the	two	experiments	undertaken	by	Willmott.	The	first	involved	showing	
a	25-minute	trial	video	to	324	students.	The	trial	was	based	on	a	real	rape	case	and	included	pre-
trial	 instructions	 and	 post-trial	 directions	 taken	 from	 the	 Judicial	 Studies	 Board	 Crown	 Court	
Benchbook. 27 	It	 was	 recorded	 in	 a	 real	 courtroom,	 with	 professional	 actors	 playing	 the	
complainant	 and	 defendant	 and	 an	 experienced	 barrister	 as	 a	 judge.	 Advice	 on	 realism	 was	
provided	by	an	expert	panel	that	included	the	barrister,	a	CPS	lawyer	and	three	senior	detectives	
from	 specialist	 sexual	 offence	 units.	 After	 watching	 the	 video,	 the	 mock	 jurors	 deliberated	 in	
groups	of	12	(as	would	be	the	case	in	a	real	jury	in	England)	for	up	to	90	minutes,	before	returning	
a	verdict.	Participants	completed	the	AMMSA,	one	of	the	most	up-to-date	RMA	scales.		
	
																																																													
25	Despite	these	methodological	issues	it	did	still	find	that	RMA	score	was	significantly	related	to	judgments	
about	 the	 complainant’s	 credibility	 (measured	 by	 asking	 participants	 to	 rate	 the	 likelihood	 that	 the	
complainant	was	lying	on	a	7-point	scale	from	“very	likely”	to	“very	unlikely”).		
26	The	mode	of	delivery	made	no	difference	to	the	results	(Stichman	et	al,	2019:	13).	
27	This	was,	at	the	time	of	the	research,	the	standard	guide	for	judges	to	refer	to	in	crafting	jury	directions.	
It	 has	 since	 been	 replaced	 by	 the	 Judicial	 College’s	 Crown	 Court	 Compendium,	 which	 serves	 the	 same	
purpose.	
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One	important	limitation	of	experiment	1	is	that	it	did	not	involve	cross-examination	–	rather	the	
complainant	and	defendant	gave	an	unprompted	account	and	the	mock	jurors	were	also	given	a	
summary	of	 the	 case	 for	 the	prosecution	 and	defence.	However,	Willmott’s	 second	experiment	
rectified	this.	It	used	a	3-hour	30-minute	live	trial	re-enactment,	which	included	examination	and	
cross-examination,	 closing	 speeches	 and	 the	 same	 legal	 directions	 as	 before.	 It	 also	 utilised	 a	
community	 sample	 drawn	 from	 the	 electoral	 register.	 The	 100	mock	 jurors	 deliberated	 in	 nine	
groups	 of	 between	 10	 and	 12	 for	 up	 to	 two	 hours.	 Both	 of	Willmott’s	 studies	 took	 substantial	
steps	 to	maximise	 realism	 and	 both	 found	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 individual	 verdict	
preferences	and	scores	on	the	AMMSA	pre-	and	post-deliberation.	
	
5.	Qualitative	studies	
	
The	studies	discussed	so	far	have	been	exclusively	quantitative.	However,	further	insights	into	the	
way	 in	 which	 prejudicial	 attitudes	 might	 influence	 jury	 decision	 making	 can	 be	 gained	 from	
another	 body	 of	 literature,	 which	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 extent	 to,	 and	 manner	 in	 which,	 false	
assumptions	about	what	 rape	 looks	 like,	and	what	genuine	victims	would	do,	arise	during	mock	
jury	deliberations.28	All	of	the	studies	involved	a	female	complainant	–	no	studies	that	have	looked	
at	mock	juror	deliberations	in	a	case	where	the	complainant	is	male	were	identified.	
	
Batchelder	 et	 al	 (2004)	 undertook	 research	 with	 151	 community	 participants,	 who	 read	 a	 trial	
transcript	of	a	rape	case	(the	length	of	which	is	not	specified,	but	it	did	include	legal	directions)	in	
which	a	 female	complainant	and	male	defendant,	who	were	both	students,	met	 in	a	bar	before	
going	back	to	her	room,	where	the	incident	took	place.	The	mock	jurors	then	deliberated	in	groups	
of	12	(bar	two	smaller	juries	of	eight	and	seven)	and	deliberations	were	recorded	and	transcribed.	
Although	the	study	was	not	aimed	at	investigating	rape	myths,29	the	researchers	noted	that	they	
arose	regularly	during	deliberations,	including	the	view	that	a	woman	who	has	been	raped	would	
always	show	distress	after	the	incident	and	the	view	that	false	allegations	of	rape	are	often	made	
by	women	who	regretted	having	sexual	intercourse.	
	
Taylor	 and	 Joudo	 (2005)	 carried	 out	 research	 with	 210	 jury	 eligible	 members	 of	 the	 public.	
Participants	watched	an	85	minute	live	trial	re-enactment	based	on	a	transcript	from	a	real	sexual	
assault	case,	using	professional	actors	(although	for	brevity	only	the	complainant	gave	evidence).30	
The	scenario	 involved	a	male	and	female	work	colleague	who	both	attended	an	office	party	and	
drank	 and	 danced,	 before	 going	 to	 another	 room	 and	 having	 sexual	 intercourse,	 which	 the	
complainant	claimed	happened	without	her	consent	(a	claim	the	defendant	disputed).	Mock	jurors	
deliberated	in	groups	of	between	10	and	12	for	up	to	an	hour.	The	researchers	did	not	record	the	
deliberations.	Rather,	after	the	juries	had	reached	their	verdicts,	they	held	group	discussions	with	
the	 participants	 to	 ask	 them	what	 they	 had	 spoken	 about.	 This	was	 far	 from	 an	 ideal	 research	
method	 –	 participants	 may	 not	 have	 been	 able	 to	 recall	 accurately	 what	 went	 on	 during	 the	
deliberations	or	might	have	been	reluctant	to	report	it.	Nonetheless,	Taylor	and	Joudo	(2005:	59)	
found	that:	
	
																																																													
28	See	also	the	focus	group	study	undertaken	by	Gunby	et	al	(2012).	
29	Its	primary	focus	was	to	examine	whether	gender	influences	verdict	choices	–	and	the	researchers	found	
that	it	did.	
30	The	 main	 purpose	 of	 the	 study	 was	 to	 investigate	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 complainant	 giving	 evidence	 in	
person	compared	to	a	live	TV	link	–	so	the	conditions	were	varied	in	accordance	with	this.	
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One	 of	 the	 key	 insights	 obtained	 during	 this	 study	was	 the	 high	 degree	 to	which	many	
jurors	believed	many	of	 the	myths	which	 surround	 rape	 in	 general.	Acceptance	of	 these	
myths	mean	that	jurors	have	strong	expectations	about	how	a	‘real’	victim	would	behave	
before,	during	and	after	an	alleged	sexual	assault	and	these	expectations	impact	on	their	
perceptions	of	the	complainant’s	credibility.		
	
The	 researchers	 pointed	 to	 a	 number	 of	 examples	 which	 arose	 regularly	 and,	 as	 they	 put	 it,	
“worked	against	the	complainant”	(Taylor	and	Joudo,	2005:	59).	These	included	the	complainant’s	
admissions	that	she	did	not	scream	or	shout	for	help;	that	there	was	no	evidence	of	 injury;	that	
she	 continued	 to	 work	 with	 the	 defendant	 after	 the	 incident;	 that	 she	 delayed	 reporting	 the	
incident	for	two	weeks;	and	that	she	was	not	visibly	upset	when	recounting	the	incident	in	court.	
Some	of	the	mock	jurors	volunteered	that	they	had	advanced	these	arguments	as	a	rationale	for	a	
not	 guilty	 verdict,	 although	 others	 reported	 that	 they	 disagreed	 and	 did	 not	 believe	 they	were	
relevant	in	reaching	a	verdict.	
	
The	most	significant	studies	of	 rape	myths	and	 jury	deliberations,	however,	are	 the	 four	studies	
undertaken	by	Vanessa	Munro,	the	first	with	Emily	Finch,	the	second	and	third	with	Louise	Ellison	
and	the	fourth	as	part	of	the	Scottish	Jury	Research.		
	
The	first	study	(Finch	and	Munro,	2006)31	involved	a	scripted	75-minute	mock	rape	trial	(including	
legal	directions	crafted	from	the	Judicial	Studies	Board	Crown	Court	Benchbook)	performed	live	in	
front	of	168	mock	jurors,	who	were	recruited	from	the	general	public.	The	study	aimed	to	examine	
the	 way	 in	 which	 an	 intoxicated	 rape	 complainant	 was	 viewed,	 so	 the	 scenario	 involved	 a	
complainant	who	was	 conscious	 and	 able	 to	 communicate	 but	 had	 trouble	walking,	 and	whose	
words	 were	 slurred.	 The	 defendant	 admitted	 the	 complainant	 was	 largely	 unresponsive	 as	 he	
undressed	her.	The	 jurors	watched	the	trial	 reconstruction	and	then	deliberated	 in	21	groups	of	
eight	for	up	to	90	minutes,	without	the	presence	of	the	researchers.	The	deliberations	were	video	
recorded.	 Each	 jury	 returned	 a	 verdict,	 and	 jurors	 also	 gave	 their	 individual	 views	 on	what	 the	
verdict	should	be,	both	pre-	and	post-deliberation.	
	
The	second	study	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2009b;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2009a;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2009c;	
Ellison	and	Munro,	2010a)32	utilised	similar	 research	methods.	This	 time	 it	 involved	a	75-minute	
mock	 rape	 trial	 performed	 live	 in	 front	of	 233	mock	 jurors,	who	again	were	 recruited	 from	 the	
general	 public.	 The	 scenario	 involved	 two	 colleagues	 who	 attended	 a	 work	 event	 before	 the	
defendant	gave	the	complainant	a	lift	home.	The	two	spent	a	few	hours	together	drinking	a	glass	
of	wine	and	some	coffee,	before	kissing.	After	that,	their	accounts	diverged,	with	the	complainant	
reporting	that	she	was	raped	and	the	defendant	claiming	they	engaged	in	consensual	intercourse.	
The	roles	were	played	by	a	mixture	of	actors	and	barristers,	and	experienced	 legal	professionals	
advised	on	the	realism	of	the	trial	script.33	The	mock	jurors	then	deliberated	in	groups	of	eight	or	
nine	(27	mock	juries	 in	total)	for	up	to	90	minutes.	Each	jury	returned	a	verdict,	and	jurors	gave	
their	individual	views	on	what	the	verdict	should	be,	both	pre-	and	post-deliberation,	but	this	time	
the	jurors	also	completed	a	RMA	questionnaire.34		
																																																													
31	Subsequently	“study	A”.		
32	Subsequently	“study	B”.	
33	The	legal	directions	they	heard	included	–	in	some	of	the	groups	–	directions	designed	to	counter	various	
rape	myths.	This	aspect	of	the	study	is	discussed	in	section	5.	
34	The	questionnaire	was	a	tailored	one	designed	specifically	for	the	project,	including	questions	relevant	to	
the	particular	trial	scenario	that	was	utilised.	
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The	third	study	 (Ellison	and	Munro,	2013;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2015)35	utilised	the	same	research	
methods	as	studies	A	and	B,	but	this	time	the	75-minute	mock	trial	involved	the	complainant	and	
defendant	having	been	in	a	relationship	that	had	broken	down.	The	alleged	rape	occurred	in	the	
complainant’s	flat,	that	they	used	to	share	together,	when	the	defendant	called	round	to	collect	
his	television.	A	forensic	examiner	testified	to	the	complainant	having	bruises	and	scratches	of	a	
sort	 consistent	with	 the	application	of	 considerable	 force,	 but	no	 internal	 bruising	 (although	he	
also	stated	that	this	is	not	uncommon	in	rape	cases).	The	study	involved	216	mock	jurors	recruited	
from	the	general	public	who	deliberated	in	27	groups	of	eight	for	up	to	90	minutes.	
	
The	final	study	was	undertaken	as	part	of	the	Scottish	Jury	Research	(Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	This	
study	utilised	similar	research	methods	to	studies	B	and	C	–	this	time	a	75	minute	trial	video	based	
heavily	on	study	C	but	adapted	to	Scottish	criminal	procedure.	It	was	the	largest	study	of	the	four,	
involving	431	mock	jurors	who	deliberated	in	32	groups	of	either	12	or	15	for	up	to	90	minutes.36		
	
All	 four	studies	found	that	rape	myth	supportive	attitudes	arose	frequently	during	deliberations.	
Space	precludes	an	extensive	discussion,	but	to	give	three	examples:	
	
Lack	of	physical	resistance.	Many	jurors	expressed	the	belief	that	a	genuine	victim	of	rape	would	
have	 fought	 back	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 she	 would	 have	 suffered	 substantial	 defensive	 injuries,	
including	 internal	 trauma.37	Acquittal	 verdicts	 were	 frequently	 justified	 with	 reference	 to	 the	
absence	 of	 more	 serious	 or	 more	 extensive	 injuries	 (Finch	 and	 Munro,	 2006:	 314;	 Ellison	 and	
Munro,	2009b:	207;	Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	Often	 female	 jurors	expressed	these	views,	asserting	
that	 if	 they	had	been	 in	 the	 complainant’s	 situation,	 they	would	have	 struggled	more	 forcefully	
(Ellison	and	Munro,	2013:	314;	Chalmers	et	al,	2019),	insisting	that	their	instinctive	reaction	would	
be	 to	 lash	out	aggressively	and	 inflict	 injury	on	 the	defendant	and	expressing	a	 confidence	 that	
they	would	be	able	to	do	this	even	where	the	assailant	was	stronger	them	themselves	(Ellison	and	
Munro,	2009b:	206;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2009c:	371).	 For	example,	one	 female	 juror	observed	“I	
think	 it’s	 instinct,	 if	 you’ve	got	a	hand	 free	you’d	grab	 for	his	eyes	or	his	 face	or	anything”	and	
another	 stated	 that	 “I	 just	 can’t	 understand	 why	 she	 wouldn’t	 push	 him	 off	 or	 do	 anything,	 I	
cannot	get	my	head	around	that”	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2009c:	371).	This	is	despite	the	jurors	in	this	
study	(study	B)	having	been	directed	that	“it	 is	not	a	requirement	for	establishing	the	offence	of	
rape	that	any	force	has	been	used”	and	neither	 is	 it	“necessary	to	show	evidence	of	any	kind	of	
struggle	 in	order	 to	establish	non-consent”.	 In	 study	A,	 some	 jurors	 insisted	 that	even	a	heavily	
intoxicated	 complainant	would	 be	 expected	 to	 offer	 physical	 resistance.	 As	 one	 juror	 put	 it,	 “a	
woman’s	got	to	cooperate	with	a	man	to	be	able	to	do	it,	to	have	intercourse,	unless	he	thumps	
her	or	what,	and	he	didn’t	–	 there	was	no	bruising	on	her	body	anywhere.	 I	would	say	she	was	
probably	drunk	but	at	the	same	time	she	more	or	less	consented”	(Finch	and	Munro,	2006:	316).	
	
Jurors	 did	 sometimes	 challenge	 those	 views	 by	 arguing	 that	 women	 facing	 sexual	 assault	 may	
freeze	and	be	too	fearful	or	shocked	to	fight	back	physically.	Reference	to	freeze	reactions	were	
most	 common	 in	 the	 Scottish	 Jury	 Research,	 most	 likely	 echoing	 the	 language	 of	 a	 national	
																																																													
35	Subsequently	“study	C”.	
36	The	study’s	primary	purpose	was	to	investigate	the	effect	of	the	unique	features	of	Scottish	juries	(three	
verdicts,	15	members	and	decision	making	by	a	simple	majority).	It	involved	64	juries	in	total	–	the	other	32	
watched	 an	 assault	 trial.	 Its	 findings	 are	 reported	 in	 Ormston	 et	 al	 (2019).	 One	 jury	 proceeded	with	 11	
members	as	a	juror	became	ill	during	deliberations.	
37	In	 the	 Scottish	 Jury	 Research,	 statements	 to	 this	 effect	 were	 made	 by	 jurors	 in	 28	 of	 the	 32	 juries	
(Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	
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campaign	by	Rape	Crisis	Scotland	(Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	However,	in	none	of	the	studies	did	these	
views	appear	to	cause	others	to	revise	their	opinion	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2015:	218;	Chalmers	et	al,	
2019).	While	 jurors	 seemed	prepared	 to	believe	 a	 freeze	 reaction	might	happen	 in	 a	 “stranger-
rape”	context,	they	seemed	less	willing	to	accept	it	in	the	context	of	an	acquaintance	rape	(Ellison	
and	Munro,	2010a:	790;	Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	As	one	juror	put	it,	“even	in	a	paralysed	state,	isn’t	
it	the	body’s	natural	reaction	to	put	up	some	kind	of	defence?”	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2009b:	206).		
	
False	allegations.	Jurors	often	expressed	views	about	the	prevalence	of	false	allegations	of	rape,	
stating	that	they	are	routinely	made	(Ellison	and	Munro	2010a:	795;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2013:	314;	
Chalmers	 et	 al,	 2019).38	In	 the	 Scottish	 Jury	 Research,	 for	 example,	 one	 juror	 commented	 that	
“there	[are]	hundreds	of	cases	coming	out	where	women	have	 lied	about	rape”	(Chalmers	et	al,	
2019).	 Some	 jurors	 constructed	 a	 narrative	 whereby	 the	 complainant	 was	 angry	 that	 the	
defendant	did	not	wish	to	start	(in	study	B)	or	resume	(in	study	C	and	the	Scottish	Jury	Research)	a	
relationship	and	made	a	false	rape	allegation	out	of	a	desire	for	revenge.	As	one	 juror	put	 it,	“a	
woman	scorned	is	so	true,	no	disrespect	girls,	it	is	though	isn’t	it?”	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2010a:	797).	
Whilst	 there	were	 jurors	who	 questioned	 how	 realistic	 it	was	 that	 a	woman	would	 put	 herself	
through	the	challenges	of	a	criminal	investigation	and	trial	merely	to	“get	one	over	on	someone,	
or	to	get	back	at	someone”,	these	comments	were	often	countered	by	jurors	who	insisted	that	“it	
does	happen”,	“love	makes	people	do	crazy	things”	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2013:	314),	“some	women	
do	just	use	[the	criminal	courts]	as	a	tool”	and	“women	can	be	vindictive”	(Chalmers	et	al,	2019).	
	
Uncontrollable	 male	 sexual	 urges.	 The	male	 defendant	was	 at	 times	 regarded	 as	 being	 at	 the	
mercy	of	his	sexual	drives,	which	may	have	led	to	him	having	a	genuine	(and	reasonable)	belief	in	
consent	 (Ellison	 and	 Munro,	 2009a:	 297;	 Ellison	 and	 Munro,	 2010a:	 793).	 The	 belief	 that	 the	
defendant	might	have	been	“so	passionate	and	 into	 it”	or	 “so	 transfixed”	 that	he	would	not	be	
able	to	“register	what	she	was	actually	doing”	was	regularly	expressed	by	mock	jurors	(Ellison	and	
Munro,	 2010a:	 793).	 One,	 for	 example,	 stated	 that	 “a	 woman	 can	 stop	 right	 up	 to	 the	 last	
second	…	a	man	cannot,	he’s	just	got	to	keep	going,	he’s	like	a	train,	he’s	just	got	to	keep	going”	
(Ellison	and	Munro,	2010a:	793).		
	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	 in	 study	 B,	 these	 attitudes	 were	 all	 more	 evident	 in	 the	 deliberations	
(where	jurors	were	discussing	the	specific	mock	trial)	than	in	the	questionnaires	they	completed	
(when	they	were	asked	about	their	attitudes	in	the	abstract)	(Ellison	and	Munro,	2010a:	790-791,	
793).	 This	 is	 an	 important	 finding.	 Even	 jurors	who	were	 found	 to	 have	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	
‘rape	myth	acceptance’	when	they	completed	the	questionnaire	sometimes	relied	on	problematic	
views,	grounded	in	those	same	stereotypes,	in	the	process	of	engaging	in	their	deliberations	about	
the	trial	they	had	just	watched.	
	
6.	Addressing	juror	attitudes	
	
There	 is	 a	 small	 body	 of	 research	 that	 has	 examined	 whether	 prejudicial	 attitudes	 can	 be	
countered	by	 juror	education	–	either	 in	 the	 form	of	directions	 from	the	 trial	 judge	or	evidence	
given	by	an	expert	witness.	Four	studies	in	peer	reviewed	journals	have	examined	this	issue.	The	
first	of	these,	although	the	most	recent,	is	the	least	realistic	in	terms	of	its	simulation	of	the	trial	
process.	Klement	et	al	(2019,	study	1)	undertook	an	experiment	with	97	US	psychology	students,	
in	 which	 they	 read	 a	 short,	 written	 scenario,	 followed	 by	 either	 no	 expert	 testimony,	 written	
																																																													
38	In	the	Scottish	Jury	Research,	statements	of	this	nature	were	made	in	19	of	the	32	juries	(Chalmers	et	al,	
2019).	
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expert	 testimony	 stating	 that	 50-90%	 of	 rape	 allegations	 are	 false,	 or	written	 expert	 testimony	
stating	 that	 false	 allegations	 are	 rare,	 at	 around	 2-10%	 of	 all	 rape	 allegations.	 The	 presence	 or	
absence	of	the	testimony	had	no	effect	on	decisions	about	guilt.	However,	the	experiment	lacked	
realism	in	a	number	of	respects,	limiting	the	weight	that	can	be	attached	to	it.39		
	
The	other	three	studies	were	more	realistic	 in	that	they	all	 involved	a	mock	trial	and	 juries	who	
deliberated.	Brekke	and	Borgida	(1988)	undertook	two	experiments,	both	involving	US	psychology	
students.	In	the	first,	208	students	listened	to	an	audiotaped	mock	rape	trial,	based	on	a	real	trial	
(which	varied	in	length	from	65	to	102	minutes,	depending	on	the	experimental	condition).	They	
then	gave	 individual	verdicts,	before	deliberating	 in	groups	of	between	four	and	six	for	up	to	30	
minutes.	 Conditions	 were	 varied	 so	 that	 there	 was	 either	 no	 expert	 testimony,	 an	 expert	 who	
testified	in	general	terms	(that	few	women	falsely	accuse	men	of	rape,	rape	is	an	under-reported	
crime,	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 rapes	 involve	 acquaintances	 and	 it	 can	 be	 better	 for	 a	 women	 to	
submit	rather	than	risk	additional	violence),	or	an	expert	who	gave	similar	testimony	but	related	it	
to	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 used	 a	 hypothetical	 example.	 Jurors	 exposed	 to	 the	 case-related	
testimony	were	significantly	more	likely	to	favour	a	guilty	verdict	pre-	and	post-deliberation	than	
either	 those	who	heard	no	expert	 testimony	or	 those	who	heard	the	standard	testimony.	There	
was	no	significant	difference	in	the	proportion	of	jurors	who	favoured	a	guilty	verdict	between	the	
standard	testimony	and	no	testimony	groups.	Their	second	study	involved	144	students	and	was	
identical	to	the	first,	except	that	all	groups	heard	some	form	of	expert	testimony,	either	standard	
expert	 testimony	or	case-specific	 testimony.	The	case-specific	 testimony	resulted	 in	a	significant	
increase	in	the	number	of	guilty	verdicts	pre-deliberation.	The	relationship	post-deliberation	was	
not	significant,	but	participants	who	had	heard	the	case-related	testimony	were	significantly	more	
likely	to	find	the	complainant	a	credible	witness.40	
	
Brekke	 and	 Borgida	 recorded	 the	 deliberations	 of	 their	mock	 juries,	 although	 the	 analysis	 they	
undertook	 was	 quantitative	 only.	 They	 found	 that	 there	 was	 limited	 discussion	 of	 the	 expert	
testimony	 during	 the	 deliberations	 of	 those	 juries	 who	 heard	 it	 (an	 average	 of	 two	 minutes	
discussion	of	the	30	minutes	total	deliberation	time).	However,	they	also	found	that	in	the	groups	
who	had	not	heard	 the	expert	 testimony,	complainant	 resistance	was	a	dominant	 theme	during	
more	than	15	per	cent	of	the	deliberation	and	discussion	tended	to	be	favourable	to	the	defence.	
The	juries	who	heard	the	case-specific	testimony	devoted,	on	average,	 less	than	two	per	cent	of	
their	 time	 to	 discussing	 resistance	 and	 the	 discussion	 was	 generally	 favourable	 towards	 the	
complainant.	
	
Spanos	et	al	(1991)	undertook	a	mock	jury	experiment	with	219	US	students,	who	were	randomly	
assigned	 to	one	of	 36	 juries,	 ranging	 in	 size	 from	 four	 to	 eight.	 They	 listened	 to	 an	 audiotaped	
mock	trial	(involving	an	alleged	rape	in	the	complainant’s	flat	after	a	date),	followed	by	either	no	
expert	 witness	 testimony,	 expert	 witness	 testimony	 or	 expert	 witness	 testimony	 and	 cross-
examination.	 The	 expert	 witness	 gave	 evidence	 aimed	 at	 countering	 a	 number	 of	 different	
possible	 false	 beliefs	 (for	 example	 that	 women	 provoke	 rape	 by	 their	 appearance	 and	 false	
allegations	are	common).	In	the	cross-examination,	he	agreed	that	there	are	documented	cases	of	
																																																													
39	A	 second	experiment	 in	which	 the	 same	 information	was	provided	by	 the	prosecution	or	defence	also	
found	that	it	had	no	effect.	The	researchers	also	conducted	two	experiments	involving	a	trial	scenario	with	
a	 male	 complainant	 and	 a	 female	 defendant,	 and	 here	 they	 did	 find	 some	 limited	 evidence	 that	 the	
testimony	(which	was	adapted	for	a	male	rape	scenario)	had	a	positive	effect.	
40	The	fact	that	the	relationship	between	the	expert	testimony	and	verdict	choices	was	not	significant	in	the	
second	experiment	may	simply	be	due	to	the	smaller	number	of	participants	(only	144,	compared	to	208	in	
their	first	experiment).	
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false	allegations	(as	well	as	making	a	number	of	other	concessions).41	At	the	jury	level,	juries	were	
significantly	more	likely	to	return	guilty	verdicts	when	they	heard	the	expert	testimony,	but	only	in	
the	 condition	 with	 no	 cross-examination.	 The	 same	 effect	 was	 found	 in	 relation	 to	 jurors’	
individual	verdicts	(although	only	post-deliberation).	The	fact	that	the	directions	were	ineffective	
when	the	expert	was	cross-examined	might	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	in	real	life	–	where	cross-
examination	 would	 always	 form	 part	 of	 an	 adversarial	 trial	 –	 expert	 evidence	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	
effective.	 However,	 as	 Ellison	 and	 Munro	 (2009c:	 376)	 point	 out,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 cross-
examination	in	Spanos	et	al’s	study	went	beyond	what	would	normally	be	acceptable	in	a	real	trial.	
Studies	 undertaken	 in	 other	 contexts	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 expert	 testimony	 can	 have	 a	
positive	impact	even	with	cross-examination	(Cutler	et	al,	1989).	However,	it	does	also	have	to	be	
said	that,	although	both	studies	did	involve	an	element	of	deliberation,	there	are	other	elements	
of	 the	research	methods	–	such	as	 their	use	of	audiotaped	mock	 trials	–	 that	 limits	 the	reliance	
that	can	be	placed	on	them.	
	
The	 final	 –	 and	most	 realistic	 –	 study	was	undertaken	by	 Ellison	 and	Munro	 (2009c).	 The	 study	
involved	216	jurors	recruited	from	the	general	public	who	deliberated	in	27	groups	of	eight.	The	
main	 features	of	 the	 research	methods	used	have	already	been	outlined,42	but	 it	 is	pertinent	 to	
add	that	there	were	nine	experimental	conditions.	The	main	substance	of	the	trial	remained	the	
same,	but	(a)	the	level	of	the	complainant’s	physical	resistance;	(b)	the	delay	between	the	incident	
and	 its	 report	 to	 the	 police	 by	 the	 complainant;	 and	 (c)	 the	 level	 of	 observable	 distress	 in	 the	
complainant’s	courtroom	demeanour	were	varied.	In	addition,	in	one	third	of	the	trials	a	direction	
from	the	 judge	 informed	 jurors	about	 the	 feasibility	of	a	 complainant	 freezing	during	an	attack,	
the	frequency	with	which	complainants	delay	reporting,	or	the	different	emotional	reactions	that	
victimisation	might	elicit.	In	another	one	third	of	the	trials,	the	same	information	was	provided	by	
an	expert	called	by	the	prosecution	and	cross-examined	by	the	defence.	In	the	remaining	trials,	no	
such	guidance	was	provided.	
	
The	 researchers	used	a	primarily	qualitative	 research	methodology,	examining	 the	way	 in	which	
the	content	of	 the	deliberations	differed	between	the	groups	who	had	received	the	educational	
guidance	 and	 those	 who	 had	 not,	 but	 they	 supplemented	 this	 with	 analysis	 of	 questionnaires	
completed	 by	 individual	 jurors	 post-deliberation.	 They	 found	 that	 the	 educational	 guidance	 on	
complainant	demeanour	and	delayed	reporting	had	a	noticeable	effect	on	the	deliberations,	but	
the	guidance	on	lack	of	resistance	did	not.	
	
In	 respect	 of	 complainant	 demeanour,	 the	 jurors	 who	 had	 been	 exposed	 to	 the	 educational	
guidance	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 make	 reference	 to	 the	 complainant’s	 demeanour	 when	 giving	
evidence	and	–	when	the	issue	was	raised	–	were	more	likely	to	offer	explanations	for	what	might	
account	 for	 the	 complainant’s	 lack	 of	 emotionality	 and	 more	 inclined	 to	 comment	 that	 it	 was	
“normal”	that	a	victim	of	rape	could	respond	in	such	a	calm	manner.	This	was	supplemented	by	
the	post-deliberation	questionnaires,	where	jurors	in	the	expert	testimony	and	judicial	instruction	
conditions	were	 less	 likely	to	say	that	 it	would	have	 influenced	their	decision	 if	 the	complainant	
had	been	more	obviously	distressed	when	giving	her	testimony.	
	
																																																													
41	For	instance,	during	cross-examination	the	expert	was	forced	to	acknowledge	that	rape	fantasies	are	not	
uncommon,	some	women	derive	sexual	gratification	from	being	tied	up,	some	women	develop	unrealistic	
expectations	of	 a	 relationship	 following	an	 initial	 sexual	 encounter,	 and	 some	 such	women	may	become	
distraught,	angry	and	vindictive	when	they	are	rebuffed.	
42	See	section	5	(Ellison	and	Munro’s	study	B).	
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In	 respect	 of	 delayed	 reporting,	 the	 jurors	who	 had	 been	 exposed	 to	 the	 educational	 guidance	
were	 more	 likely	 to	 state	 that	 they	 were	 untroubled	 by	 the	 three-day	 delay	 in	 reporting	 the	
alleged	rape.	Jurors	 in	the	no-education	condition	were	more	 likely	to	express	the	view	that	the	
complainant’s	 response	had	undermined	her	 credibility	 and	described	 the	delayed	 reporting	as,	
variously,	“odd”,	“strange”	and	“disturbing”.	This	was	also	supported	by	the	questionnaire	data,	
where	jurors	in	the	non-guidance	condition	were	more	likely	to	agree	that	it	would	have	made	a	
difference	to	their	deliberations	if	the	complainant	had	reported	the	alleged	assault	to	the	police	
sooner.	
	
In	relation	to	lack	of	resistance,	there	was	no	discernible	difference	in	either	the	deliberations	or	
the	 questionnaire	 data	 between	 the	 way	 jurors	 responded	 to	 the	 complainant’s	 claim	 to	 have	
frozen	in	shock	after	initially	attempting	to	push	the	defendant	away	and	telling	him	to	leave	her	
alone.		
	
The	researchers	offer	a	number	of	possible	explanations	for	the	different	findings	in	relation	to	the	
different	types	of	rape	myth.	It	may	simply	be	that	some	beliefs	–	including	those	about	injury	and	
resistance	–	are	 so	deeply	entrenched	 that	attempts	 to	 influence	 them	through	 juror	education	
will	have	limited	effect	(Cowan,	2019:	38;	Temkin,	2011:	724).	It	may,	however,	be	the	case	that	
the	particular	 directions	on	 lack	of	 resistance	utilised	 in	 the	 study	were	 ineffective.	 In	 line	with	
judicial	guidance,	the	directions	were	general	in	nature	–	they	did	not	use	hypothetical	examples	
and	were	not	linked	to	the	facts	of	the	particular	case.	This	explanation	would	be	consistent	with	
Brekke	and	Borgida’s	study,	where	expert	testimony	was	only	effective	when	it	was	case-related	
and	used	a	hypothetical	example.		
	
It	may	also	be	the	case	that	Brekke	and	Borgida’s	case-related	testimony	was	more	effective	than	
the	abstract	testimony	because	it	explained	why	some	rape	victims	might	react	in	a	particular	way	
(for	example	that	freezing	is	a	natural	physiological	response	to	danger	or	that	there	may	be	good	
reasons	 for	 not	 reporting	 a	 sexual	 offence	 immediately).	 This	 would	 also	 be	 consistent	 with	
experimental	research	into	the	effectiveness	of	judicial	directions	more	generally,	which	suggests	
that	jurors	are	more	likely	to	follow	instructions	if	it	is	explained	why	they	are	being	given.43	It	is	
also	important	that	judicial	directions	are	simple	and	comprehensible.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	
the	direction	 in	Ellison	and	Munro’s	 study	was	not	–	but	experimental	 research	has	 shown	 that	
juror	comprehension	of	judicial	directions	is	low	and	that	it	can	be	considerably	improved	by	using	
plain	 language	 and	 other	 methods	 of	 simplification	 (Chalmers	 and	 Leverick,	 2018:	 23-27).	 The	
direction	also	needs	to	be	recalled	by	jurors	and	here	written	directions	can	play	an	important	role	
(Chalmers	and	Leverick,	2018:	32-26).	
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 timing	was	 an	 issue	 and	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 expert	 testimony	 or	
judicial	directions	on	the	issue	of	non-resistance	(as	well,	potentially,	as	on	demeanour	and	delay)	
would	have	had	a	greater	influence	if	it	had	preceded	the	complainant’s	testimony	(Ellison,	2019:	
275).	 There	 are	 two	 possible	 reasons	 for	 this.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	 research	
evidence	 that	 suggests	 that	 jurors,	 rather	 than	 passively	 absorbing	 all	 the	 evidence	 as	 it	 is	
presented	 to	 them,	 instead	 settle	 on	 a	 ‘story’	 that	makes	 sense	 to	 them	 relatively	 early	 in	 the	
proceedings	and	then	attempt	to	fit	the	remainder	of	the	evidence	into	that	narrative	rather	than	
evaluating	 it	 independently	 (Pennington	 and	 Hastie,	 1992).	 Hearing	 the	 guidance	 before	 the	
complainant’s	 testimony	would	mean	 that	 it	would	be	salient	 in	 jurors’	minds	before	 they	 form	
their	opinions	about	the	complainant’s	credibility	based	on	their	own	preconceptions	and	beliefs.	
																																																													
43	See	the	survey	of	the	relevant	evidence	in	Leverick	(2016:	581).	
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The	second	is	that	directions	given	at	the	end	of	the	trial	might	get	lost	as	they	will	simply	be	one	
part	of	a	lengthy	summing	up	and	detailed	instruction	on	the	relevant	law	which,	in	a	real	trial,	will	
be	 given	 after	 several	 days	 of	 evidence	 (Temkin,	 2011:	 731).	 The	 point	 is	 strengthened	 by	 the	
research	 evidence	 on	 jury	 directions	 more	 generally,	 which	 has	 found	 that	 pre-instruction	
improves	 juror	memory	 for	and	comprehension	of	 jury	directions	 (Chalmers	and	Leverick,	2018:	
27-31).	This	might	also	point	to	one	advantage	of	expert	testimony	over	judicial	directions	given	at	
the	 end	 of	 a	 trial	 –	 expert	 testimony	 might	 be	 more	 memorable	 as	 the	 expert	 will	 only	 be	
testifying	 about	 a	 single	 issue	 and	 jurors	 will	 be	 less	 likely	 to	 switch	 off	 and	 miss	 important	
information.	
	
7.	Conclusion	
	
To	summarise,	 there	 is	overwhelming	evidence	 that	 jurors	 take	 into	 the	deliberation	room	false	
and	prejudicial	 beliefs	 about	what	 rape	 looks	 like	and	what	 genuine	 rape	victims	would	do	and	
that	 these	 beliefs	 affect	 attitudes	 and	 verdict	 choices	 in	 concrete	 cases.	 This	 evidence	 is	 both	
quantitative	and	qualitative.		
	
The	most	 important	 quantitative	 studies	 are	 those	 that	 have	 examined	 the	 link	 between	 scales	
designed	to	measure	rape	myth	supporting	attitudes	and	judgments	about	guilt.	A	total	of	28	such	
studies	were	identified	and	all	but	three	found	a	significant	relationship	between	jurors’	scores	on	
RMA	 scales	 and	 their	 judgments	 about	 guilt	 in	 a	 specific	 rape	 case	or	 scenario.	All	 three	of	 the	
studies	 that	did	not	 report	a	statistically	 significant	 relationship	had	methodological	weaknesses	
that	 limit	 the	 reliance	 that	 can	 be	 placed	 on	 them.	 The	 25	 studies	 that	 did	 demonstrate	 a	 link	
varied	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 realism	 of	 their	 research	 methods.	 Many	 used	 students	 as	 their	
experimental	 participants,	 although	 that	 in	 itself	 is	 likely	 to	 under-estimate	 the	 scale	 of	 the	
problem,	 given	 that	 higher	 scores	 on	 RMA	 scales	 are	 correlated	with	 lower	 educational	 levels.	
Only	two	studies	included	an	element	of	deliberation	in	the	research	design.	However,	those	two	
studies	 both	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 link	 between	 juror	 attitudes	 and	 verdict	 choices	 persisted	
even	after	deliberation,	suggesting	that	the	deliberation	process	is	not	a	‘magic	bullet’	in	terms	of	
curing	problematic	attitudes.	These	two	studies	were	also	the	most	realistic	experiments	and	the	
fact	 that	 they	 both	 found	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 RMA	 scores	 and	 verdict	 choices	 is	
notable.	
	
The	qualitative	studies	paint	a	 similar	picture.	They	demonstrate	 that	 jurors	 regularly	express	 in	
deliberation	 false	 beliefs	 about	 matters	 such	 as	 an	 absence	 of	 extensive	 injury	 or	 resistance	
indicating	 consent	and	 rape	allegations	often	being	unfounded	and	easy	 to	make.	 These	beliefs	
have	been	expressed	 in	highly	 realistic	 studies	 that	have	 replicated	 real	 rape	 trials	 as	 closely	 as	
possible.	 Importantly,	 these	beliefs	were	 sometimes	 expressed	by	 those	who	had	not	 indicated	
that	they	held	such	beliefs	when	asked	about	them	in	the	abstract,	via	a	questionnaire.	
	
All	of	 this	 raises	the	spectre	of	whether	the	 jury	 is	an	appropriate	decision	making	body	 in	rape	
and	other	 sexual	offence	cases.	 It	 is	argued	here	 that	 it	would	be	very	premature	 to	 reach	 that	
conclusion.	The	conscientiousness	with	which	mock	jurors	approach	their	deliberations	(Finch	and	
Munro,	2008;	Ellison	and	Munro,	2010b;	Ellsworth,	1989;	Ormston	et	al,	2019)	suggests	that	juries	
take	 their	 decision	 making	 role	 very	 seriously.	 Mock	 jury	 studies	 have	 also	 demonstrated	 that	
jurors	 bring	 with	 them	 relevant	 life	 experience	 and	 understanding	 that	 help	 them	 assess	 the	
plausibility	 of	 claims	made	 by	 complainants	 and	 defendants	 in	 a	way	 that	 a	 professional	 judge	
might	 find	 more	 difficult	 (Chalmers	 et	 al,	 2019).	 Then	 there	 are,	 of	 course,	 the	 political	 and	
philosophical	 justifications	 for	 juries,	which	are	 rooted	deeply	within	 the	 legal	 culture	of	 the	UK	
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jurisdictions,	 around	 citizen	 participation	 and	 the	 need	 to	 provide	 a	 check	 on	 state	 power	
(Redmayne,	 2006;	 Houlder,	 1997).	 That	 said,	 the	 volume	 of	 evidence	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	
linking	rape	myths	and	jury	decision	making	should	give	us	at	the	very	least	pause	for	thought.		
	
Before	suggesting	anything	as	drastic	as	removing	juries	from	criminal	trials,	however,	it	is	worth	
considering	whether	the	answer	might	lie	in	addressing	problematic	attitudes	via	juror	education,	
such	as	trial	judge	direction	or	expert	evidence.	The	studies	reported	here	give	some	limited	cause	
for	optimism	 in	this	 respect,	with	evidence	that	 juror	education	can	have	an	 impact.	 It	 is	clearly	
not	 as	 simplistic,	 however,	 as	 simply	 telling	 jurors	 that	 they	 are	 wrong	 and	 expecting	 them	
automatically	 to	 change	 their	 views.	 Some	views	may	be	more	difficult	 to	 shift	 than	others	and	
consideration	also	needs	to	be	given	to	the	timing	of	any	intervention	and	to	its	content.	But	this,	
it	 is	 argued	here,	 is	 the	way	 forward,	 alongside	well-	 funded	 research	 that	 is	 able	 to	 rigorously	
assess	the	effectiveness	of	such	interventions.		
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